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1nis paper describes part of the results of a research project undertake11 at the Employment 
Institutions. The purpose of this research was to consider whether, and if so, in what way, 
the Employment Court and the Employment Tribunal contribute to the general position of 
greater disadvantage experierzced by wome11 workers since the introduction of the Employme11t 
Contracts Act. This paper exan1i11es reported decisions of tJze Court and Tribunal over the 
1991-1994 period, focusing on perso11al grievances, and concludes that while the employme11t 
institutio11s' decisions themselves do 11ot disclose a pattern of gender bias, there is evide1zce 
of gender bias i11 the awards 1nade to parties, particularly in alvards con1pe11sating for 
humiliatiotz, loss of dig~zity arzd irl)ury to the feelings of the employee. 
Introduction 
Prior to the enactment of the Employment Contracts Act ("the Act'' or "the ECA"), there was 
much speculation concerning the impact the Act would have upon women. Since the passage 
of the Act in May 1991, a large literature has been amassed documenting its effect on won1en: 
little of it positive. The E~CA, we are told, according to one extensive study, .. does not offer 
any advantage to women workers and . . . in fact, it has clearly disadvantaged women 
workers" (Hammond and Harbridge, 1993: 28). The contribution ofth,e Act itself to women's 
worsened employment situation has been well debated, researched and recorded (Hill and du 
pJ,essis, 1993; Wilson, 1994). 
The purpose of this paper, however, is not to re-present these findings in an alternative form. 
Rather, this research investigates whether the employment institutions set up by the ECA do 
themselves contribute to th~e gender bias experienced by women under the new employment 
law regim~e. 
Similar research on a much wider scale has been undertaken overseas, including several states 
of the USA, various provinces of Canada, and some states of Australia. Commonly known 
as "gender bias task force" reports, these reports have revealed a disturbingly pervasive trend 
of discrimination against women, both overt and systemic, existing in the justice systems of 
the state or province concerned, on the part of judges, court staff, police and other lawyers. 
This paper seeks to parallel their investi,gations on a reduced scale, looking at employn1ent 
institutions' decisions in an attempt to discern whether or not gender bias exists in New 
Zealand's employment institutions. 
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"Gender bias" is a tetnt often used with little precision attached to its meaning. Following 
the approach of many of the gender bias task forces, this report assigns a structural meaning 
to gender and gender bias. "Gender" means more than "biological differences between women 
and men. It includes the ways in which those differences, whether real or perceived, have 
been valued, used and relied upon to classify women and men and to assign roles and 
expectations to them." (ALRC, 1993: 25). Using Mahoney's definition for the Australian Law 
Refornt Commission (1993: 26), gender bias in the law occurs when there is: 
[B]ehaviour or decision making by participants in the justice system which is based on, or 
reveals reliance on, stereotypical attitudes about the nature and roles of men and women or of 
their relative worth, rather than being based on an independent valuation of individual ability, 
life experience and aspirations . . . It exists when issues are viewed only from the male 
perspective, . . . when problems of women are trivialised or oversimplified, when women are 
not taken seriously or given the same credibility as men. 
It is important to recognise that gender bias can stem not only from the actions of individual 
decision-makers but can be present in the structure of institutions and their practices 
themselves. Thus gender bias can manifest itself in many ways: through awards of 
compensation; through sexist comments or treatment; by glossing over the different working 
experiences of men and women and failing to see how these might have had an impact on the 
case; and through the very processes of dispute resolution used by the employment 
institutions. 
Methodology 
Due to the difficulties of creation, compilation, and analysis inherent in a survey of those with 
experience in appearing before the Court and Tribunal (both as advocates/counsel and parties), 
in addition to the problems of obtaining a representative sample large enough to derive 
statistically significant conclusions, as well as overall time constraints, it was decided to 
forego this option in favour of a selective analysis of Tribunal and Court decisions over the 
period 1991 to 1994. Thus, the employment institutions were subject to an investigation of 
what they present for the record rather than presenting a mosaic of the impressions of those 
who have participated in the Court and Tribunal's dispute resolution processes. 
It should be noted that as only reported decisions were considered for the quantitative analysis 
section, the following discussion will not be fully representative of Tribunal decisions, given 
the low rate of reporting for these decisions. The parameters of this paper were further 
narrowed by deciding to concentrate on personal grievance decisions and unjustified dismissal 
cases in particular. The later qualitative analysis, which focuses on decisions which may 
particularly affect women, considered both reported and unreported cases, and allows for 
discussion of gender bias in its wider institutional context. 
The cases on which this paper is founded were taken from: firstly, a consideration of the 
Employment Reports of New Zealand (ERNZ) volumes from 1991 to 1994, backed up by a 
specific search for cases indexed under "discrimination - sexual"; "personal grievance" and 
"sexual harassment" for the same period; and secondly, reported and unreported cases 
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Table 1: Decisions for/against by gender 
IN FAVOUR AGAINST 
WOMEN MEN WOMEN MEN 
1991 69% {1) 63% (12) 31% (5) 37% (7) 
1992 44% {8) 77% (27) 56% {10) 23% (8) 
1993 80% {12) 83% (38) 20% (3) I7% {8) 
1994 59% {13) 79% (42) 4I% {9) 21% (II) 
As this table shows, there do not seem to be any obvious trends in decisions from a gendered 
point of view. Men and women were almost equally likely to win their cases in 1991 and 
1993, with the advantage changing from women to men between those two years by six 
percent in favour of women to three percent in favour of men. In 1992 and 1994, there were 
large gaps in the percentage of men and women who succeeded in their actions . However, 
this did not remain stable, but swung from a 33 percent difference in 1992 to a 20 percent gap 
in 1994. Not only does the likelihood of winning one's case shift between the sexes from 
year to year, but the percentage difference of those succeeding or failing changes at an 
inconsistent rate from year to year. Given the widely varying figures here, the only sensible 
conclusion to draw from this analysis is that gender does not appear to influence the result 
of the decision at this basic level. 
Further analysis was then undertaken to see whether the decisions of men and women for 
example in a managerial capacity were likely to be overturned or upheld according to gender. 
Table 2: Treatment of managerial decisions made by men and women 
DECISION OVERTURNED DECISION UPHELD 
WOMEN MEN WOMEN MEN 
1991 I 16 1 9 
1992 1 25 I 17 
1993 1 18 1 1 
1994 1 20 1 4 
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Table 3: Awards made aader s.40(1)(a) and s.41(1) 
1991 
Average 
Range 
Median 
1992 
Average 
Range 
Median 
1993 
Average 
Range 
Median 
1994 
Average 
Range 
Median 
WOMEN 
$6,852.65 
$7,460.66 - $6,330.00 
$6,809.97 
$7,492.18 
$22,829.00- $1,700.00 
$3,957.68 
$8,822.79 . 
$17,388.36- $2,080.00 
$7,000.00 
$3,421.19 
$4,491.96- $1,442.00 
$4,329.60 
Section 40(1)(6): Reinstatement 
MEN 
$7,449.70 
$19,824.90- $1,853.00 
$3,200.00 
$6,061.60 
$26,036.00 - $430.17 
$5,000.00 
$39,020.66 
$334,226.00- $1,706.40 
$5,731.20 
$9,874.43 
$22,500.00 - $800.00 
$7,487.00 
The Labour Relations Act provided that reinstatement was to be the primary remedy where 
it was included in the remedies sought by a worker in a personal grievance. 3 The ECA gives 
reinstatement equal priority with the other remedies under s.40. It would appear that this has 
led to a considerable decrease in the number of reinstatements ordered as part of a personal 
3 Section 228 LRA. 
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4 For instance, X v Y Ltd &: NZ Stock Erchange [1992] 1 BRNZ 863 and Ntl11Sen v Wellington Oty 
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7 Fortex Group Ltd v Laxton [1994] 1 ERNZ 402. 
1 Robalson v Port Nelson Ltd [1994] 1 ERNZ 976. 
9 Hobbs v North Shore City Council [1992] 1 ERNZ 32. 
10 Blomjield v Kentucky Fried Chicken (1992] 1 ERNZ 126; Hildred v Newmans Coach Lines Ltd [1992] 
3 BRNZ 165. 
11 Airways Corp of NZ Ltd v Brunton [1994] 1 ERNZ 352. 
12 Laveryv Trust Bank Wellington Ltd [1994] 2 ERNZ 339. 
13 Hobday v 1immu Girls' High School Board of'Irustees (1993] 2 BRNZ 146; (1994] 1 BRNZ 724. 
14 Shaffer v Gisborne Boys' High School Board of Trustees [1995] 1 BRNZ 94. 
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Although the sample is small, it appears that women are awarded reinstatement less often than 
men are. This may be because women seek it less often than men do, maybe finding 
alternative employment more easily, or perhaps because they more often want to avoid a 
return to a place of unpleasant memories. 15 Obviously, by the time a case has reached the 
point of adjudication, the relationship between the parties will not be the best. The 
employment institutions do not have the power to award remedies a personal grievant has not 
sought. 
Section 40(1)(c): Compensation 
There are two kinds of compensation awarded under s.40(l)(c). Compensation under 
s.40(1)(c)(i) is for "humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to the feelings of the employee", 
while s.40(1)(c)(ii) compensates for the "loss of any benefit, whether or not of a monetary 
kind, which the worker might reasonably have been expected to obtain if the personal 
grievance had not arisen." Unfortunately for the investigations of this report, decision-makers 
did not always specify whether the compensatory sum awarded was under s.40(1)(c)(i) or 
s.40(1)(c)(ii) or an aggregate of both. For tabular purposes, compensation was recorded 
simply as an award made under s.40(1)(c). However, since each subsection clearly has a 
different purpose, the amount awarded consequently reflects this. Comparisons of the awards 
made are therefore meaningless unless it is known whether the award was made to 
compensate for humiliation or loss of benefit. Thus in the analysis which follows the data 
presentation focuses only on those cases where the purpose of the compensation was indicated 
by the decision-maker. It should be noted that this tends to narrow the range of decisions 
available for analysis somewhat. 
Again, the compensation awarded under this section appears to follow no pattern that can be 
tied to gender. While in 1991 and 1992 men's and women's average awards were very 
similar, and the midpoint awarded the same, this changed in 1993 where the average award 
made to men was five times that for women, and the median amount of compensation for men 
was three times higher than the women's median. However, this state of affairs was reversed 
the following year when the men's average was two-fifths of the women's average, and the 
women's median almost twice that of men. 
Compensation for loss of benefit appears to be linked to income and other non-discretionary 
factors. Therefore, it was decided to focus on compensation levels for humiliation, loss of 
dignity and injury to feelings, as it is here that the possibility of gender bias seems more 
likely as there is no statutory forrnula for deciding the level of award. 
15 There appears to be no research on this point. However, an overview of the employment institutions 
database reveals that for the period 1991 - 1995 women seeking reinstatement were almost as equally 
likely to be successful as not (data on file with author). There was one case recording the abandonment 
of reinstatement as a remedy by woman: TerHaar v Eliot-Cotton Associates [1993) 1 ERNZ 371. 
There was also one case of a man refusing an employer's offer of reinstatement: Finau v Carter Holt 
Building Supplies [1993] 2 ERNZ 971. 
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By this system, the award of compensation becomes removed from consequences it was 
supposed to be compensating for. Income may not be relevant at all to the way someone may 
react when unjustifiably dismissed or sexually harassed. 
There are also no guarantees that a person occupying a managerial position will need more 
compensation for injury to feelings than may someone who works on the factory floor. There 
is the unstated inference that those who earn less have feelings that are easily assuaged, and 
so less is required to soothe them. Again, as women are clustered into a small range of low-
paying occupations, this devalues the work-related hurt of women arising from a personal 
• grtevance. 
It is suggested that awards of compensation under s.40(1)(c)(i) should focus more closely on 
the actual circumstances that gave rise to the personal grievance. Greater emphasis should 
be placed on the actual reactions and feelings of the personal grievant, rather than lining up 
compensation with the person's income. A more individualised and contextual assessment of 
the hurt the individual has suffered would go some way towards negating the gender bias 
ingrained in this system. Although the employment institutions claim to uphold this approach, 
it seems that it is not necessarily always practised. 17 
Another area for concern arises when the amounts awarded to women for injury to feelings 
are read in conjunction with the comments of decision makers regarding the level of 
emotional harm suffered as a result of the personal grievance. Even allowing for differences 
amongst decision makers, the overall impression is that women's harm is compensated at a 
lower level than men's, even when the effects of the matters leading to a personal grievance 
have been similar or more serious. 
For example, in 1991, a woman described as being "severely traumatised" and having 
undergone a "great deal of distress" after an unjustified dismissal was awarded $5,000 
compensation under s.40(1)(c)(i),18 while in the same year a man also unjustifiably dismissed 
was awarded $3,000, even though the Tribunal member commented "there was surprisingly 
little evidence about the humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to Mr Roderique' s feelings. "19 
The award was justified on the basis that all dismissals are "naturally humiliating" and that 
his employer had made a hurtful comment about Mr Roderique, mitigated by the long time 
allowed before Mr Roderique actually had to leave the company.2° Comments of this nature 
make one wonder what amount would have been awarded as a token gesture to a woman who 
had suffered only minimal hurt. 
17 See PA 0 'Connor v Brass [1994] 1 ERNZ 388, 396. 
18 Math v NZ Printing and Related Trades JUOW [1991] 2 ERNZ 871, 877. 
19 Roderique v Port FM Ltd [1991] 3 ERNZ 825, 837. 
20 Roderique, at 838. 
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It is tempting to ascribe this state of affairs to the employment institutions coming to terms 
with the new regime set up by the ECA. However, this does not seem to provide an adequate 
explanation. In 1992, another unjustified dismissal case saw $7,000 compensation awarded 
under s.40(1)(c)(i), where again the male grievant had again "adduced little evidence ... on 
the extent of the humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings. "21 A woman in similar 
circumstances, providing "non-existent or meagre" evidence of the injury to her feelings 
(although the Tribunal acknowledged that she had suffered "some distress" and had had "quite 
a shock"), was awarded only $4,000.22 
This pattern of the differing valuations of the hurt suffered by men and women continued in 
1992. In two cases where the parties were both awarded $8,000 compensation for humiliation 
and loss of dignity, Mr Baussmann' s evidence stated that he "felt uncomfortable", he had not 
been treated with "proper courtesy", while the Tribunal did not elaborate on its reasons for 
making the award other than stating that it accepted the evidence of his wife, 23 while Mrs 
Harding, who was dismissed by h~er ex-husband, found the whole ~episode "deeply 
distressing. "24 The complainants appear to have had distinctly different experiences, yet this 
is not reflected in their awards. 
This trend exhibits itself consistently over the four years under investigation. The employ-
ment institutions claim to uphold the "eggshell skull" rule, commenting in 1994:25 
That means that different sums of compensation might be awarded to two different grievants 
unjustifiably dismissed on exactly the same facts. The two grievants may be constructed with 
two differ~ent personalities. One personality may be more sensitive to the effects of the 
dismissal . . . The question is not the degree of cause, but the degree of [effect] on the 
feelings of the uniquely constituted personality of the en1ployee . 
Having said this, the Tribunal went on to award the "extr~emely disturbed" Ms Brass in that 
case $3,500 for what it described as a "major injury to her feelings". On appeal, the award 
was upheld, and the presiding judge concluded that she was "quite shattered emotionally by 
her experience" describing it as "v,ery frightening" (her mentally disturbed employer's actions 
had resulted in her constructive dismissal). Two months later, a motor mechanic was awarded 
21 Forbes v Colonial Mutual [1992] 1 ERNZ 32, 51. 
• 
22 Prebble v Coastline FM [1992] 1 ERNZ 52, 62. 
23 Baussmann v Trilogy Business Systems Ltd [1992] 1 ERNZ 386, 395-397. 
24 Harding v Challenge Real &tate [1992] 1 ERNZ 546, 556. 
25 PA 0 'Connor, at 396. 
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$3,750 as compensation for his hurt feelings in an unjustified dismissal case, with no 
discussion of the effect on the employee. 26 
It is difficult to see what could account for these very similar awards in strikingly different 
circumstances, given the supposed commitment to taking into account the actual effect on the 
employee. 
In 1994 the Tribunal awarded $30,000 compensation to a gay man who was accidentally 
"outed" (i.e. his homosexuality was disclosed without his consent) at work to compensate for 
the homophobic sexual harassment he was subject to (including threats to do him bodily 
harm), leading to continuing insecurity at work and eventually resulting in his transfer to 
Australia.27 While this decision is laudable from the point of view of taking sexual 
harassment seriously, it is cause for concern that the amount awarded in 1995 to Gaye 
Davidson in the Christchurch Civic Creche case was also $30,000.28 Ms Davidson was 
subject to police investigation and stood trial for child abuse allegations, received a bullet in 
the mail with her name engraved on it and has had to give up her chosen career and retrain 
in her late forties.29 While both cases are undeniably serious, it is questionable that the 
disruption of Mr L' s career and the disruption of Ms Davidson's life were deserving of the 
same amount of compensation. 
Discretionary compensation awards allow institutions to (amongst other things) decide how 
much people are worth. It seems clear that there is a distinct pattern in the employment 
institutions of valuing the hurt experienced by women as being worth less than the hurt 
experienced by men. Women seem to have to experience deeper levels of injury to their 
feelings than men do, in order to receive the same level of compensation and are compensated 
less when they experience similar effects from a personal grievance as men do. Even if it 
could be explained by saying that the employment institutions expect women to be more 
emotional than men and so rank their outward show of emotion with the lesser, more 
contained reactions of men as actually being of equal effect, this relies on sexist stereotypes 
in making decisions, abstracts the individuals from their experiences, devalues and trivialises 
the harm suffered by women and uses a male standard as a yardstick for compensation. This 
is gender bias. 
The majority of this analysis centred on awards for unjustified and constructive dismissal, 
these being the most common causes of claims for compensation under s.40{l)(c)(i). 
However, dismissals are not the only area where this undervaluing of women occurs. Davis 
26 
27 
28 
29 
Van Leeuwen v Skedden [1994] 1 ERNZ 624. 
L v M [1004] 1 ERNZ 123. This amount comprised $25,000 for hurt and humiliation and $5,000 for 
the sexual harassment. Another $2,000 was awarded for resettlement costs. 
Davidson v Christchurch Civic Creche [1995) 1 ERNZ 172. 
Davidson, Appendix B to judgment. 
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the High Court, Smellie J considered that s.38 of the HRC Act did not include the power to 
order general anti-discrimination programmes as had been done in that case. 34 
Education plays a large part in transforming attitudes generally. It is an important tool in the 
goal of reducing employment-related sexual harassment in New Zealand. It is therefore 
unfortunate that the provisions of the ECA which might be used to recommend educative 
programmes are so rarely used. This was noted by the Court in 1993, which proposed that:35 
When the Tribunal finds that an employee has been sexually harassed in the employee's 
employment and the person or persons responsible is or are known or identifiable, the Tribunal 
should ordinarily recommend to the employer that it arrange rehabilitative counselling for that 
person or persons. To enable this to be done effectively, I have asked the chief executive 
officer to ascertain and make available to Secretaries of the Tribunal infonnation concerning 
the pmvtdms of SBdl COII"SOlling senrices in the main centres. 
It is unclear why no recommendations pursuant to s.40(1)(d) have been made since this 
comment was made by the Court. The fact that the provisions are not mandatory and give 
recommendatory powers only to the decision-maker should not be seen as an excuse to shy 
away from making a recommendation at all. 
It also should be noted that neither of the two cases which considered s.40(1)(d) employed 
it to make recommendations concerning a specific harasser (or group of harassers). Although 
in both cases the personal grievants had left their workplaces, this should not be seen as a 
solution to the problem. While efforts to stamp out workplace culture which condones and/or 
encourages sexual harassment are to be encouraged, recommendations concerning the 
behaviour of certain persons should also be considered more frequently. 
Selective qualitative analysis of Court and Tribt•nal decisions 
This section focuses on the employment institutions' treatment of issues which are of 
particular relevance to women: discrimination and sexual harassment. 
Discrimi1Uition 
Discrimination on the basis of sex is a ground for a personal grievance under s.28 of the Act. 
Decisions considering this section are few. The very small number of cases here makes 
comment concerning any trends of gender bias or otherwise difficult. Nonetheless, they are 
mentioned here for the sake of completeness. 
34 NZ Van Lines, at ISO. 
As Z v A above, at 496 (emphasis added). 
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It would appear that most sexual harassment cases that come before the employment 
institutions are settled by mediation. However, all sexual harassment cases considered under 
the ECA provisions still form only a small part of the total of cases settled each year (even 
when taking into account the fact that many cases investigated by the HRC are not 
employment-related) (Swarbrick: 1995: 28). The reluctance of women to bring sexual 
harassment cases before the employment institutions is cause for concern. This concern may 
be explained somewhat by considering the fact that for women sexually harassed in their 
employment, the ECA sections are rather restrictive: liability is only imposed against the 
employer even where the harassment is carried out by co-workers or clients, 40 and, in the 
case of sexual harassment by those other than the employer, liability occurs only when the 
employer has not taken whatever steps are practicable to prevent a repeat of the sexual 
harassment by that person.41 Thus, in many cases, women may simply not be eligible to use 
the ECA provisions, whereas the HRC procedures are wider in their scope. Although no 
blame can be laid at the door of the employment institutions for the narrow application of the 
ECA in sexual harassment matters, the narrowness of the sections themselves remains a 
concern, especially as they give the impression that sexual harassment in the workplace is not 
properly the sphere of employment legislation. Further, HRC procedures come at no cost, 
while for those without the benefit of union representation, the thought of paying for legal 
advice may act as a deterrent to taking a case. 
While the employment institutions themselves cannot be considered to have contributed to 
these reasons why women might prefer to take their cases to the HRC, they are not immune 
from critique of their dealings with the cases that do actually come before them. Davis (1994: 
31) concluded that there was considerable evidence of gender bias in this area of the law, 
including: 
analysis of concepts from a male perspective; failure to appreciate and act upon the real life 
experience of women; of the effects of decisions on women; reliance on myths 
about sexual harass1nent; and failure to recognise unstated assumptions or to scrutinise tmtested 
asswnptions . . . Some decision makers appear neither to understand nor, in some cases, even 
to accept the basic prenlise on which the legislation is founded: that sexual harasstnent is 
1mlawful and can seriously ha•nt women ... 
This documented lack of sympathy on the part of the employment institutions would appear 
to underscore the decision of many women to prefer the HRC over the employment 
institutions' procedures. However, in the few years since that comment was made, there 
appears to have been a significant improvement in the employment institutions' treatment of 
the sexual harassment cases that have come before them. Although the number of cases 
remains small, the seriousness with which sexual harassment is now taken by the employment 
institutions has increased considerably. 
4° Compare s.68 HR.A, where individuals other than the employer may be made personally liable . 
. 
4
• Section 36(3) ECA, emphasis added. This means that where the complainant is sexually harassed by 
a succession of co-workers or customers no liability attached to the employer for failing to prevent 
sexual harasSinent by a number of people. 
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more likely to be untrue than true. "47 All acts of alleged sexual harassment were to be 
treated with the same degree of seriousness for the purposes of proof. 
Previously, it had been understood that complaints to an employer of sexual harassment had 
to be in writing before the employer was obliged to take action. Such a requirement may be 
a disincentive for women to make, or pursue, a complaint. However, in the 1994 case of X 
v AB Co Ltd,48 the Tribunal dispelled this misconception over the use of the word "may" in 
s.36(1)(b), stating "justice should not be a slave to grammar ... the words [are not] 
mandatory, they are used in an empowering sense."49 
Mediation: advantages and disadvantages for women 
Mediation of employment disputes plays a large part in the activities of the Employment 
Trib1Jnal. In fact, nation-wide, approximately 60 percent of all cases before the Tribunal are 
mediated, with 85 percent of these being settled, (Gardiner, 1993: 3) although regional 
differences mean that the total of mediated settlements is considerably higher in some centres. 
One significant aspect of mediated settlements is that they are confidential. This means that 
a considerable proportion of all cases that are brought before the employment institutions are 
una:vailable for research scrutiny. Given the small numbers of women appearing in the cases 
that are available, it would seem that a greater proportion of women than men have their cases 
resolved at the mediation stage. As mediated settlements appear to fotnt a significant part of 
women's experiences with the Employment Tribunal, but cannot be analysed for reasons of 
confidentiality, what follows is a theoretical analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of 
mediation as a form of dispute resolution for women. However, this section comes with a 
caveat: it should not be taken as an evaluation of actual-Tribunal practice, although naturally 
what is said here will be of relevance to the issue of gender bias in the employment 
institutions. 
The typical mediation involves a dismissed employee and his or her employer. Over 80 
percent of mediations are personal grievances, and of those, 95 percent relate to alleged 
unjustifiable dismissals (Gardiner, 1993: 4). Eighty-five percent of women are employees, 
compared to seventy-three percent of men, while eleven percent of men are employers as 
compared to five and a half percent of women (Ryan, 1993). Thus, in the typical mediation, 
a dismissed female employee is twice as likely to be facing a male employer than a female 
one. Whether the typical personal grievance mediation is also more likely to see a female 
employee than a male one is unclear, given the lack of data relating to the gender of the 
personal grievants. 
At 475. 
[1994] 2 BRNZ 419. 
49 X v AB Co Ltd, at 422. 
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(especially where the employment relationship may be continuing) than their rights. Recent 
critiques of rights-talk have commented on the way in which isolated discussion of rights can 
lead to a sense of alienation from the justice system (although see Williams, 1987). 
Moreover, there has also been much research in the past fifteen years, suggesting that women 
define themselves in terms of their relationships to others (Gilligan, 1982). If this is so, as 
a process which operates with a stronger emphasis on the parties' relationship and discourages 
reliance on caselaw and legal principles, mediation is a method of resolving differences which 
fits more with women's sense of themselves than adjudication. In that mediation also puts 
the facts at the centre of the dispute, as opposed to the law, this lessens the chance of gender 
bias as the reality of women's working lives are uncovered and acknowledged, something 
which does not always happen when it is the law that is the prime concern. 
However, mediation cannot be seen as a cure-all form of dispute resolution for women. 
Concerns have been raised about the inability of mediation to redress the power imbalance 
of the parties who come to mediation. Power is situational in the employment relation, and 
as already noted, women are almost sixteen times more likely to be an employee before the 
Tribunal than an employer. Power is also intertwined with gender, (MacKinnon, 1987) and 
women employees are twice as likely to be facing a male employer than a female one. When 
these two combine, the possibility arises that women will be more compromising than men 
to their detriment. If the mediator maintains a position of strict neutrality, and does nothing 
to redress the power imbalance, the disadvantage women experience in adjudication, then 
mediation fails as a means of empowering women and perpetuates inequality instead. 
The flip side of concerns about neutrality is the issue of mediator bias. Generally, the fact 
that mediations are private is seen as a benefit for both parties, enabling them to make 
concessions and discuss matters they would not bring up in a public arena. However, the 
private and informal nature of mediation does allow the mediator to shape the procedure, and 
possibly the result: for example, a mediator may take an active role, advising the parties on 
their options and suggesting possible solutions, or he or she may simply chair discussions 
between them. Mediators have the opportunity to advance certain values by their actions 
which may harm women or exhibit sexist behaviour by their treatment of the parties which 
is never exposed to public light. 
Overall, mediation has many advantages which adjudication cannot match. However, women 
going into mediation do not wholly escape the "male" nature of adjudication, for mediation 
comes with its own dangers which should not be ignored. 
Conclusion 
The overt and widespread gender bias documented by the task forces in North America and 
Australia has not been paralleled by this investigation into New Zealand's employment 
institutions. The statistical analysis reveals little in the way of the sex of the parties 
influencing the decision. These non-patterned results indicate that findings of fact and law 
are made free from considerations of the sex of the parties before the employment institutions. 
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